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UNJUST ENRICHMENT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TORT
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE
CONTEXT?
Aura Weinbaum†
Abstract: It is generally accepted within the scholarly international community
that global climate change is occurring and is due at least in part to anthropogenic
activity. Strategies to mitigate climate change harms and adapt to inevitable climate
change-induced consequences are influencing legal, political, and human rights
frameworks. Thus far, international litigation attempts to hold emitters accountable have
been unsuccessful: Tuvalu’s threat to sue the United States and Australia at the
International Court of Justice, and the Inuit’s petition to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights were both hampered by procedural and substantive legal issues.
Perhaps in response, the United Nations and a range of other actors have taken steps since
2005 to enhance the linkages between climate change and human rights as a way to
augment the obligations of states to protect their citizens and enhance international
cooperation in addressing climate change. While necessary in the grand scheme, this
progress does not immediately create a remedy for some Small Island Developing States
(“SIDS”), such as Tuvalu. This comment argues that tort and human rights-based
litigation may not be the most effective approach for SIDS facing the dire consequences
of climate change. Rather, SIDS may benefit from pursuing compensation based on
unjust enrichment, focusing on benefits conferred on emitters rather than harms caused or
rights violated. If successful, unjust enrichment litigation would allow these States to
avoid the specific proximate cause, cause-in-fact, and sanction requirements associated
with torts, and the legal obligation and enforcement problems associated with the process
of developing and clarifying human rights law, while simultaneously securing necessary
funding to implement adaptation strategies.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The projections described by the International Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) reveal an anticipated incongruity in climate change
impacts across the globe.1 In particular, Small Island Developing States,
(“SIDS”) such as the country of Tuvalu, will suffer disproportionately from
the impacts of climate change.2 Importantly, SIDS such as Tuvalu have
contributed to the movement to draw linkages between human rights and

†

The author would like to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal and
other reviewers for their guidance and support.
1
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7-22 (M.L.
Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, The Climate of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock: Climate Change and
the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Warming, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1593-95 (2007).

430

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 2

climate change,3 and have also contributed to attempts to build tort-based
international climate change case law,4 yet these developments have not
produced any form of compensation for the country. Without the requisite
funding to take immediate action, SIDS such as Tuvalu may face the
destruction of their environment and livelihood,5 with no feasible plan for
adaptation.
This comment argues that countries such as Tuvalu may wish to
pursue compensation to pay for adaptation strategies in international
tribunals and domestic courts using the principle of unjust enrichment. Part
II provides a synopsis of prevailing scientific analysis in support of climate
change, contextualizes the climate change impacts experienced by Tuvalu,
and identifies two existing policy responses to climate change. Part III
considers the inadequate application of tort and human rights frameworks to
the SIDS context. Part IV discusses the principle of unjust enrichment, its
existence in international law, its applicability to the Tuvaluan context, and
potential challenges SIDS may face in pursuing claims under this legal
theory.
II.

FOR SOME SIDS, MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES ALONE
CANNOT ADDRESS THE THREATS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Scientists researching climate change emphasize that climate change
stresses differ among every climatic zone.6 SIDS are particularly at risk and
will suffer disproportionately from the impacts of climate change.7 The
capacity for countries to adapt to their unique climate change-related
experience depends on a number of factors, including economic and natural
resource circumstances, “social networks, entitlements, institutions and
governance, human resources, and technology.”8 Because SIDS tend to lack

3

See Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action,
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 444 n.27 (2009).
4
See, e.g., Katherine McGrow, ‘Climate refugee’ nation Tuvalu ponders legal options against
polluters, PACIFIC.SCOOP, Sept. 9, 2009, http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2009/09/climate-refugee-nation-tuvaluponders-legal-options-against-polluters/.
5
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1597.
6
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Ch. 17: Assessment of adaptation
practices, options, constraints and capacity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 720 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter17.pdf. Examples
of “climatic zones” include “dryland, floodplains, mountains, Arctic, and so on.” Id.
7
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1593-95.
8
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at 719.
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many of these adaptive factors, it is likely that climate change adaptation
will be particularly challenging for such countries.9
A.

Human-Caused Climate Change and Associated Sea Level Rise
Threaten SIDS

Scientific analysis attributes climate change to human activity.
Representing much of the scientific community, the IPCC10 defines climate
change as “any change in climate over time, whether due to natural
variability or as a result of human activity.”11 Even so, the Third Assessment
Report of the IPCC establishes that human activity, and particularly
greenhouse gas emissions (“GHGs”), is the driving force behind global
warming.12 The IPCC predicts that current trends in global warming will
exacerbate the number of people suffering from disease, hunger,
malnutrition, and death; and injury from heat waves, floods, storms, fires,
and drought.13

9
See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Ch. 16: Small islands, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP
II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (M.L.
Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter16.pdf.
10
The IPCC’s reports represent the most comprehensive and accepted data on the subject of climate
change. Specifically, the IPCC states: “[t]he Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set
up jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to
provide an authoritative international statement of scientific understanding of climate change. The IPCC’s
periodic assessments of the causes, impacts and possible response strategies to climate change are the most
comprehensive and up-to-date reports available on the subject, and form the standard reference for all
concerned with climate change in academia, government and industry worldwide. Through three working
groups, many hundreds of international experts assess climate change in this Fourth Assessment Report.”
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Introduction to the Working Group II Fourth
Assessment Report, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY :
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE i (M.L. Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-intro.pdf.
11
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 n.1 (S. Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.
12
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/pdf/WG1_TARFRONT.pdf (“ . . . there is new and stronger evidence that most of the . . . warming observed over the last
50 years is attributable to human activities.”).
13
John H. Knox, Essay, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 165 (2009)
(citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 393 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).
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Furthermore, the global scientific community agrees that
anthropogenic sea level rise will affect millions of people living near coasts.
Coastal zones will experience significant erosion and other risks due to
climate change and sea level rise.14 Coastal flooding alone, without
intervention, may grow more than tenfold by 2080, thereby affecting over
100 million people per year.15 To make matters worse, the IPCC anticipates
continuously rising sea levels, cyclone intensification, and intensification of
storm surges.16
SIDS are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and
will suffer disproportionately from its impacts.17 Their extreme vulnerability
is due both to economic and geographic circumstances.18 Many SIDS face
economic disadvantages associated with remoteness, susceptibility to natural
disasters, and heavy dependence on international trade, and on local natural
resources.19 In addition, twelve of the fifty-one SIDS are categorized under
the United Nations as Least Developed Countries, a circumstance which
further exacerbates their difficulty in responding to climate change in an
adequate manner.20
SIDS’ geographic context contributes to their climate change impact
vulnerability because they are increasingly exposed to and influenced by
large ocean-atmospheric interactions; shifts in severe weather such as El
Niño, monsoons, cyclones, and hurricanes; and sea-level rise.21 Sea level
rise is particularly alarming for SIDS as many of these islands rise less than
four meters above sea level.22 The 2007 assessment of the IPCC projected a
14

See id. (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 317 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).
15
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Ch. 6: Coastal Systems and Low-Lying
Areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (M.L. Parry Et al. eds, Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter6.pdf.
16
See Knox, supra note 13, at 165 (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 317 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).
17
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2.
18
See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9.
19
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Vulnerability and Adaptation to
Climate Change in Small Island Developing States: Background paper for the expert meeting on
adaptation
for
small
island
developing
States,
4
(2007),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_measures_art_48/application/pdf/200702_s
ids_adaptation_bg.pdf.
20
See id.
21
Id.
22
Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climate Change: The End of the Line in
International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107, 113 (2003/2004) (citing
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER V: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
BIODIVERSITY 34 (Habiba Gitay et al. eds., 2002)).

MARCH 2011

UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT

433

sea level rise of 0.19 meters to 0.58 meters by the end of the century.23
Newer studies predict a more drastic scenario: an increase in sea level rise
of 0.5 and 1 meter by 2100.24 Rising sea levels have immediate
consequences for small island states: infrastructure and settlements are often
located near the shore, and are thus threatened by rising waters.25 The IPCC
has found that islands face increasing “frequency and severity of flooding
from sea surges . . . ; eroding beaches undermine fishing and tourism, two
critical economic bases for most small island states . . . . [Additionally,]
their freshwater resources are likely to be ‘seriously compromised’ as a
result of rising sea levels and reduced rainfall in summer months.”26
Therefore, SIDS face tremendous degradation of the island environments
upon which their economies rely, which in turn also suffer and decline.27
Ultimately, SIDS may face total destruction and the end of their existence as
communities.28
Thus, countries such as Tuvalu, with significant coastal exposure, will
likely experience many of the negative consequences anticipated by the
IPCC. A particularly offensive component to this scenario is the fact that
SIDS emit less than 1.5% as much GHGs as do industrial countries.29
Despite the fact that SIDS have contributed very little to climate change,
they will suffer disproportionately from its negative impacts.30
Consequently, they will be forced to shoulder the burden of activities for
which they are not responsible.
B.

A Case Study on SIDS: Tuvalu Faces Particularly Threatening Risks
Due to Climate Change

Tuvalu’s geography makes it particularly vulnerable to sea level rise.
The country is located between Hawaii and Australia and is one of nine
atolls in the South Pacific comprising the Oceana island group.31 It is
23
John H. Knox, Symposium, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 479 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY 323-24 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).
24
Id. (citing A Sinking Feeling, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 82).
25
See id. at 479-80 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY 689, 701 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).
26
Id. at 480 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY
689, 695, 697, 701 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).
27
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1597.
28
Id.
29
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Climate Change: Small Island
Developing States 9 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/cc_sids.pdf.
30
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1593.
31
See Henry W. McGee, Jr., Litigating Global Warming: Substantive Law in Search of a Forum, 16
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 382 (2005).
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“composed entirely of reef islands on atolls and table reefs and is thus highly
vulnerable to inundation and coastal erosion, particularly in light of expected
future rises in seal level.”32 Tuvalu covers twenty-six square kilometers,
with twenty-four kilometers of coastline, and a population of approximately
11,000.33 Its highest point lies just five meters above sea level.34 In 2000,
Tuvalu appealed to neighboring Australia and New Zealand to take in its
citizens if rising sea levels should make the country uninhabitable,35 but its
efforts were unsuccessful.36
Meanwhile, Tuvalu continues to face the problems of sea-level rise
head-on. Recently, Tuvalu’s capital island, Fongafale islet of Funafuti Atoll,
flooded during spring high tides.37 In 1997, the islet of Tepuka Savilivili
was struck by three cyclones.38 An estimated 6.7% of Tuvalu’s land was
removed and washed away by these cyclones, including the islet’s vegetation
cover. One study posits that sea-level in the Tuvalu region is rising, based
on data which suggests that relative sea-level rise at Funafuti, Tuvalu was
2 1 milimeter per year over the years spanning 1950 to 2001.39 Clearly,
such trends should not be ignored.
Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (“NAPA”)40
identifies key environmental climate change stresses in six significant
sectors: coastal zones, soils, water resources, land and the marine

32
Hiroya Yamano et al., Atoll Island Vulnerability to Flooding and Inundation Revealed by
Historical Reconstruction: Fongafale Islet, Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu, 57 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE
407, 409 (2007).
33
See CIA World Factbook: Tuvalu, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/tv.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Australia has effectively closed its doors to Tuvalu, while New Zealand has agreed to admit a
maximum of 75 Tuvaluans per year, “who must be ‘of good character and health, have basic English skills,
have a job offer in New Zealand, and be under 45 years of age.’” Rosemary Rayfuse, W(h)ither Tuvalu?
International Law and Disappearing States, 9 U.N.S.W. Law Research Paper No. 9, 9 (2009), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=unswwps.
37
Yamano, supra note 32, at 408.
38
Kennedy Warne, Tuvalu: drowning or waving: the low-lying islands of the Pacific Nation of
[Tuvalu] have long been seen as the most likely victims of global climate change. And already, several
islands are experiencing regular episodes of flooding. But is there any truth behind the headline stories of
an imminent exodus?, 80 GEOGRAPHICAL 54, 55-56 (2008).
39
John A. Church, Neil J. White & John R. Hunter, Sea-Level Rise at tropical Pacific and Indian
Ocean Islands, 53 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 155, 164, 166 (2006).
40
The UNFCCC describes National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) as plans that
“provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond to their
urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change—those for which further delay would increase
vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage.” UNFCCC, National Adaptation Programmes of Action,
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
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environment, agriculture, and health.41 Tuvalu’s NAPA also predicts that
climate change and variability will adversely affect biophysical processes in
the following ways:
The vulnerability of communities to impacts [of] climate
change, sea level rise and extreme event[s] will increase due to
the lack of national economic resources and limited investment
capacity, the high dependency of communities on natural
resources, and the lack of institutional capacity to address
climate change . . . . Increasing intensity of climate change
impacts will significantly decrease fruit tree yields, especially
the breadfruit and coconut trees. Thus, availability of nutritious
domestic foods will be at risk in the future, affecting the
livelihood of the people who depend solely on the natural
resource base . . . .42
Furthermore, due to climate change and sea level rise, Tuvalu has already
observed:
a) High groundwater level[s] during high rainfall intensities and
rising sea level; b) High incidences of water scarcity due to
high frequency of low rainfall days and prolonged drought,
especially in highly populated areas such as Funafuti; c)
Decrease in agricultural productivity due to pest and fruit flies
infestation; d) Decrease in coral and lagoon fisheries
productivity due to the high soil erosion burying adjacent
corals; e) Increasing severity of coastal erosion; f) Increasing
and wider saltwater intrusion into coastal areas and pulaka pits;
and g) Coastal flooding and inundation.43
Thus, the island nation of Tuvalu has experienced and will continue to
experience severe problems associated with climate change, which may
ultimately force the country to relocate its population.44

41
TUVALU DEP’T. OF ENV’T., MINISTRY OF NAT. RES., ENV’T., AG., AND LANDS, TUVALU’S
NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMME OF ACTION 19 (2007), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
42
Id. at 21.
43
Id. at 21-22.
44
Tuvalu has already been in discussion with Australia and New Zealand about relocating its
citizens. See Rayfuse, supra note 36, at 9.
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Room for Improvement: Complementary Policy Responses to Climate
Change

Two complementary strategies, mitigation and adaptation, dominate
the policy responses to climate change. Much of the debate around climate
change has, until fairly recently, dealt with the mitigation of GHGs.45 In
2001, the IPCC Third Assessment Report produced by IPCC Working Group
II argued that mitigation and adaptation should be developed simultaneously
in the global response to climate change.46 The ensuing Report determined
that “adaptation is a necessary strategy at all scales to complement climate
change mitigation efforts,” and “those with the least resources have the least
capacity to adapt and are the most vulnerable.”47 Policy responses to climate
change have thus focused on these two strategies.
Mitigation includes reducing GHGs in an effort to abate and prevent
the further exacerbation of climate change.48 Mitigation efforts employ
strategies to enhance the removal of GHGs by creating GHG “sinks.”49
Such GHG sinks refer to “forests, vegetation or soils that can reabsorb
CO2”50 or “process[es], activit[ies] or mechanism[s] which remove[] a
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the
atmosphere.”51 International efforts at mitigation include the Kyoto
Protocol,52 followed by the non-binding Copenhagen Accord.53 Because
45
According to the IPCC, “Greenhouse gases effectively absorb thermal infrared radiation, emitted
by the Earth’s surface, by the atmosphere itself due to the same gases, and by clouds. Atmospheric
radiation is emitted to all sides, including downward to the Earth’s surface. Thus greenhouse gases trap
heat within the surface-troposphere system. This is called the greenhouse effect.” INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS, GLOSSARY: A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, 946 (A.P.M. Baede, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at http://www.ipccwg1.unibe.ch/publications/wg1-ar4/ar4-wg1-annexes.pdf.
46
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE
THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARspm.pdf.
47
Id.
48
IAN BURTON, ELLIOT DIRINGER & JOEL SMITH, ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
INTERNATIONAL
POLICY
OPTIONS
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/PEW_Adaptation.pdf.
49
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Fact Sheet: The need for mitigation
1
(Nov.
2009),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_mitigation.pdf.
50
Id.
51
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], article 1(8), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/INFORM/84,
1771
U.N.T.S.
107,
(May
9,
1992),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
52
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Chapter 1: Introduction, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
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some major emitters refuse to curb their GHG emissions, mitigation may
only contribute to the prevention of further climate change (or at least,
limiting the cumulative effects of ongoing emissions) rather than reversing
climate change.54
Adaptation, on the other hand, concerns the efforts of states to cope
with the impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided.55 Adaptation
measures encompass a number of strategies to avoid the negative
environmental and human tolls of climate change.56 Historically, measures
to cope with weather and climate-related impacts have included crop
diversification, irrigation, water management, disaster risk management, and
insurance.57 Recent adaptation studies have examined more drastic adaptive
strategies focused on migration, resettlement, and relocation.58 Increasingly,
countries with coastal areas are exploring innovative adaptation practices in
response to rising sea levels and increased storm surges—for example,
enhancing coastal infrastructure, constructing cyclone-resistant buildings,
“capacity building for shoreline defense system design,” instituting coastal
realignment programs, and encouraging coastal landowners to “act in ways
that anticipate sea-level rise.”59 Notably, the IPCC report comments that
development and implementation of adaptation measures face considerable
“environmental, economic, informational, social, attitudinal and behavioral
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 97 (B. Metz et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter1.pdf. Countries that have
ratified the Kyoto Protocol have agreed to reduce their carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur
hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbon, and perfluorocarbon emissions. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Annex A, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 10,
1997). As of October 2010, 191 countries and the European Union have signed and ratified the Protocol.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter Kyoto Status of Ratification]. The United States has signed but has not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol. Id. The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, and the U.N. Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen, held in December 2009, was intended to produce the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. See
Daniel Bodansky, Current Development: The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem,
104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 230, 230 (2010).
53
The non-binding Accord “does not establish emissions reduction targets . . . nor does it establish a
deadline for the signing of a binding international agreement that would do so.” Hannah Chang,
International Executive Agreements on Climate Change, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 337, 338-39 (2010).
Additionally, the Accord relies on domestic actions to establish emissions targets for developed countries,
while, for example, the United States cannot pledge any emissions reduction targets without passing
corresponding climate legislation. Id.
54
See Jason A. Lowe et. al., How difficult is it to recover from dangerous levels of global warming?,
4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS. 1, 8 (2009).
55
See BURTON, supra note 48.
56
Id.
57
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at 719.
58
Id. at 736.
59
Id. at 722.
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barriers,” and that developing states are further hampered by a lack of
available resources and insufficient adaptive capacity.60 Thus, some
developing states that have contributed the least to GHGs are now in the
precarious position of facing some of the most drastic adaptation strategies,
with relatively few resources to do so.61
III.

TORT LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS MAY NOT MEET THE
IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF SIDS’ CLIMATE CHANGE VICTIMS

Two case studies demonstrate that attempts to litigate international
climate change claims based in tort law and human rights violations are
unlikely to be successful. This is due in part to the fact that these
frameworks do not adequately contemplate the unique and novel situations
faced by climate change victims. Tort claims are subject to attenuated causal
chains, thus making them difficult to prove in court. Human rights-based
frameworks for addressing climate change are still in preliminary stages and
are not yet developed enough to be practical for the particular adaptation
context faced by worst-case scenario island nations.
A.

International Litigation Responses to Climate Change Have
Employed Tort Law and Human Rights with Little Success

Two of the most publicized instances of attempted climate change
litigation employed tort law and human rights claims. The tort claim,
announced by Tuvalu in 2002, consisted of a threat to sue the United States
and Australia for those countries’ contributions to the harms caused by
emitting GHGs. The second, beginning in 2005, involved the Inuit
Circumpolar Council’s (“ICC”) petition submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”).
Unfortunately, both concluded without legal success: Tuvalu’s threat to sue
never materialized, and the IACHR decided against processing the petition.
1.

Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the United States and Australia Contemplated a
Tort Claim Before the International Court of Justice

The Kyoto Protocol binds ratifying countries to specific reduction
goals for GHGs.62 Although the United States and Australia participated in
60
Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1,
16 (2007).
61
See, e.g., Gordon supra note 2, at 1593-95.
62
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Gordon, supra note 2, at 1586.
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Protocol drafting negotiations and agreed symbolically to certain reductions
in emissions, neither country had ratified the Protocol by 2002.63 Thus,
although the Protocol became effective, it remained non-binding upon two
of the biggest emitters in the world.
According to some accounts, under former Prime Minister Koloa
Talake, Tuvalu began preparing to sue the United States and Australia in
2002 in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for failing to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, and contributing to the rising sea levels experienced by the
country.64 Some descriptions of the threat to sue allude to a lawsuit based in
negligence.65 Other accounts point more generally to a tort liability-based
theory using such language as “specific causation” and “responsibility,” or
“wrongfully caused or will cause damage,”66 all of which conjure the
concepts of wrongful acts that result in injury associated with tort
frameworks. The apparent motivation for the lawsuit was to generate funds
in damages and to relocate its population.67 A law firm in Melbourne had
advised the country to pursue its claims for compensation in the ICJ.68
Prime Minister Talake announced that Kiribati and the Maldives would join
the lawsuit.69 However, Tuvalu’s subsequent Prime Minister, Saufatu
Sopoanga, dropped the suit before it could materialize.70
2.

The Inuit Circumpolar Council Unsuccessfully Contemplated a
Human Rights Claim

Yet another heavily publicized attempt at climate change litigation
involved the Inuit and the ICC human rights-based petition in 2005. To date,

63
Rebecca Jacobs, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the
United States in the International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 103, 114 (2005). Australia
has since ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2007. See Kyoto Status of Ratification, supra note 52.
64
Akiko Okamatsu, Problems and Prospects of International Legal Disputes on Climate Change 1,
Berlin Conference on the Human Rights Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Dec. 2, 2005,
available at http://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/eCOPIES/Countries/Tuvalu/47.pdf; see also Warne, supra note
38, at 55.
65
See, e.g., Jennifer Kilinski, Comment, International Climate Change Liability: A Myth or A
Reality?, 18 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 377, 393 n.75 (2009).
66
See, e.g., McGrow, supra note 4; Joyeeta Gupta, Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention:
Litigation as a Tool to Address Climate Change, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INTL. ENVTL L. 76, 78
(2007).
67
See Leslie Allen, Will Tuvalu Disappear Beneath the Sea?, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Aug., 2004, at 5.
68
See Mark Chipperfield, Drowning Islands of Tuvalu Sue UK Government to Stay Afloat., THE
SCOTSMAN PUBLICATIONS LTD, Apr. 7, 2002.
69
Tiny
Pacific
Nation
Takes
On
Australia,
BBC NEWS, Mar.
4,
2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1854118.stm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
70
See McGrow, supra note 4.
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the ICC71 petition submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier to the IACHR72 is the
only concrete legal claim taken to an international tribunal on behalf of
climate change victims.73 The petition represented the American and
Canadian Inuit.74 It alleged that the United States had continuously violated
the petitioners’ human rights by failing to limit its GHG emissions.75 The
petition linked the impacts of climate change on Inuit life to human rights,
including the “rights to life, health, property, cultural identity, and self
determination.”76 While the Commission did hold a hearing on the
connection between human rights and climate change in March 2007, it
determined that it would not process the petition, stating that “the
information provided does not enable us to determine whether the alleged
facts would tend to characterize a violation of [protected human] rights.”77
No further action has been taken by the Commission since the hearing.78
While the petition was not legally successful, it has been recognized for
publicizing the link between human rights and climate change.
B.

Tort Law Is an Inadequate Basis for International Climate Change
Litigation Due to the Complexity of Causal Chains in Climate Change
Cases and Other Procedural Hurdles

Tort law is a problematic basis for international climate change
litigation primarily due to the complexity of establishing the requisite
elements of tort liability in relation to the complex causal chain of climate
change and associated harms. These substantive issues, in addition to other
71
The ICC “is an international non-governmental organization representing about 150,000 Inuit in
Alaska, Canada, Greenland (Denmark), and Chukotka (Russia).” Timo Koivurova, International Legal
Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of Climate Change: Problems and Prospects, 22 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 267, 285 (2007) (citing INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONFERENCE,
http://inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang=En&Parent ID=16).
72
The IACHR is “one of two bodies in the Inter-American system for the promotion and protection
of human rights . . . . The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS).”
Organization
of
American
States:
Inter-American
Commission
on
Human
Rights,
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
73
Koivurova, supra note 71.
74
Id. (citing INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONFERENCE, PETITION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS SEEKING RELIEF FROM VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM GLOBAL WARMING CAUSED BY
ACTS
AND
OMISSIONS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf).
75
Limon, supra note 3, at 441. Specifically, as the world’s leading emitter of GHGs at the time, the
petitioners alleged that the United States was violating human rights by failing to alter its climate change
policies and by not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. See Joanna Harrington, Climate Change, Human Rights,
and the Right to Be Cold, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 513 (2007).
76
Knox, supra note 13, at 191.
77
Knox, supra note 23, at 482.
78
Knox, supra note 13, at 192.
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procedural issues, support the proposition that Tuvalu’s lawsuit against the
United States and Australia in the ICJ would have failed.79
1.

Tuvalu Would Face a Number of Substantive Legal Hurdles in a Claim
Based in Tort Liability Brought Before the ICJ

To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, that the duty was breached, and
that the breach was the cause of the damage claimed by the claimant.80 The
most obvious drawback of tort liability-based climate change litigation is the
complexity of establishing a causal link between a particular emitter and a
particular country’s experience of climate change. One scholar has
identified a potential climate change causal link as approaching the
following:
1) companies produce fuels, power, engines, and other
products; 2) consumer use of these goods and products
generates carbon dioxide emissions, which rise into the
atmosphere; 3) the emissions combine with other greenhouse
gas emissions to warm the Earth via the greenhouse effect; 4)
this warming causes sea levels to rise, permafrost to thaw, and
sea ice to melt and thin; and 5) these effects cause damage to
plaintiffs’ property. Arguably, this end result has been
foreseeable for several years.81
Clearly, such a complex causal chain carries with it an arduous burden of
proof, and presents significant opportunities for failure.
Tracing harms and apportioning damages among multiple defendants
would be difficult under a climate change fact pattern. Tracing harms in the
climate change scenario is particularly complicated because establishing
specific causal links between a GHG emitter and a particular harm caused
faces significant scientific limitations, due in part to the fact that harms
caused by GHGs are dispersed globally rather than locally. Consequently,
79
For a general discussion of procedural issues raised by international climate change litigation,
including venue and standing, see generally Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States
in International Forums for Global Warming Emissions, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10185 (2003), available at
http://www.climatelaw.org/articles/strauss_elr_article.pdf.
80
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §6 (2002).
81
David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 27 (2003). In the alternative to a negligence claim, an action based
in the tort of public nuisance may alleviate some of the causation problems associated with negligence tort
claims. See, e.g., Donna Green & Kristy Ruddock, Could Litigation Help Torres Strait Islanders Deal
With Climate Impacts?, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 23, 27 (2009).
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all emitters contribute to some extent to all impacts, thus necessitating a
proportional liability scheme determined by morality and policy, rather than
merely science and law.82 For example, liability could be based on “a
source’s total emissions, or only on those emissions in excess of some
‘optimal’ level;”83 on the basis of “average or marginal impact of
emissions;”84 on the basis of current or cumulative/historic emissions;85 or
on current or projected harms.86
Substantive complications under international and tort liability law
would have greatly hampered the Tuvaluan claim before the ICJ.87 First,
Tuvalu would need to prove that the applicable law here, tort liability, is a
general principle of international law.88 Then, to prove its tort claim, Tuvalu
would need to demonstrate that the United States and Australia owed a duty
of care to the island nation, but breached that duty. The most obvious
obstacle would be that Tuvalu would need to establish a causal relationship
between Australia and the United States’s excessive GHG emissions, and the
harm caused.89 Moreover, Tuvalu would need to determine appropriate
damages. Because the “law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured
person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to
the tort,”90 constructing a world based on behavior in which the two
countries conformed to the requisite duty of care would likely be purely
speculative, due to the complex scale of such a scenario.

82
Daniel A. Farber, Apportioning Climate Change Costs, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 21, 40
(2007/2008).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 43.
85
Id. at 45.
86
Id. at 46.
87
See Jacobs, supra note 63, at 117.
88
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ establishes the four sources of international law the ICJ
should apply, including international conventions and treaties, customary international law, general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified
publicists. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
89
Jacobs, supra note 63, at 114; Okamatsu, supra note 64, at 2. Okamatsu adds that in 2005, Tuvalu
began focusing on major U.S. and Australian corporations in the petroleum, automobile, weapons and
tobacco sectors, seeking to sue these companies in their home countries for negligence in implementing
mitigating measures. Okamatsu notes that such suits would pose problems because the alleged activities
taken are not illegal under each country’s domestic laws. Okamatsu further explains that a causal link from
particular corporations to specific emissions or harms would also be extraordinarily difficult. See also Tom
Price, The Canary is Drowning: Tiny Tuvalu Fights Back Against Climate Change, GLOBAL POL’Y F., Dec.
3, 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/30312.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010)
(explaining the difficulty of apportioning liability when there are multiple corporate defendants).
90
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 901 cmt. A (1979).
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Tuvalu Would Face a Number of Procedural Legal Hurdles in a Tort
Liability Claim Brought Before the ICJ

In addition to the substantive defects the Tuvaluan case would have
likely encountered, there would have been a number of procedural hurdles
the country would have encountered at the ICJ. Primarily, the Tuvaluan
lawsuit would not have been successful against both countries in the ICJ
because the ICJ would not have had jurisdiction over the United States in the
matter. For a state to bring a case before the ICJ, the court must have
jurisdiction over all state parties.91 Jurisdiction is primarily established by:
1) state consent (“compulsory jurisdiction of the court”), 2) mutual consent
between the parties involved, or 3) authorization via treaty.92 While the ICJ
would have been an appropriate venue for a lawsuit against Australia, given
that it accepts the court’s jurisdiction without reservation,93 jurisdiction over
the United States would have been problematic and unlikely.94 Thus, Tuvalu
would have been precluded from bringing suit before the ICJ against the
United States.
C.

Though Developing, Human Rights Frameworks Are Currently
Insufficient as an Effective Basis for International Climate Change
Litigation

The clarification and progression of human rights should complement
existing legal strategies in the climate change legal context, but the human
rights framework cannot stand alone in helping to secure compensation for
SIDS like Tuvalu. The application of human rights frameworks to SIDS
experiencing negative climate change impacts may take place in two ways:
first, conventional human rights can be invoked to support claims of rights
91
See, e.g., International Court of Justice: Contentious Jurisdiction, http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
92
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. No. 993. Article 36
of the Statute of the ICJ states: 1) “The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer
to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force. 2) The state parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a) the interpretation of a treaty; b)
any question of international law; c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation; d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation.” See also Strauss, supra note 79, at 10185.
93
See id.
94
The United States withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction in 1986. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note
79, at 10186. Thus, the United States would have to consent to jurisdiction, or stipulate to jurisdiction
under treaty. In this case, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, so jurisdiction by treaty
would not apply.
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infringement experienced by victims of climate change;95 and second,
evolving human rights can be clarified and then applied to support such
claims of rights infringement.96 SIDS have been active proponents of both
the utilization and development of rights-based frameworks in response to
climate change.97
From a SIDS perspective, efforts to utilize conventional human rights
theories could rely on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.98 For
example, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
that “no one shall be denied their nationality.”99 In 2007, Tuvalu’s Prime
Minister Apisai Ielemia stated “the climate change impact . . . is an
infringement of our fundamental rights to nationality and statehood, as
constituted under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international conventions.”100 Surely, any forced relocation events due to
climate change (e.g. rising sea levels and inundation of land) implicate
challenges for sovereignty, statehood, and nationality.
More progressive approaches to the application of human rights
attempt to recognize and strengthen the link between climate change and
human rights by advocating for and codifying a human right to a safe or
clean and secure environment.101 One source of such a right could be the
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment which states,
“[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity
and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve
the environment for present and future generations.”102 Using this example,
adverse consequences of climate change would be a violation of the rights
guaranteed under a broad interpretation of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment.
95

Gillespie, supra note 22, at 122.
Id.
97
See, e.g., Apisai Ielemia, A Threat to our Human Rights: Tuvalu’s Perspective on Climate
Change,
UN
CHRONICLE
(2007),
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/cache/bypass/home/archive/issues2007/pid/4824?ctnscroll_a
rticleContainerList=1_0&ctnlistpagination_articleContainerList=true; see also infra text accompanying
note 100; Limon, supra note 3, at 442 (discussing Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s
statement in 2007 that the “world would need to reconceptualize climate change as a profoundly human
issue with human causes and human consequences . . . including the effects of climate change on human
rights.”).
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Gillespie, supra note 22, at 122.
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Id.
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Ielemia, supra note 97.
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Gillespie, supra note 22, at 122.
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Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (June 16, 1972), in Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, sec. 1, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1972), reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972), quoted in Gillespie, supra note 22, at 122-23.
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Advocates of this second approach point to the law’s development and
practice using current illustrations: for example, Marc Limon notes that the
first explicit attempt to draw the connection between human rights and
climate change occurred in 2005 when the alliance of Inuit filed their
petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.103 Another
major step of progress in developing this link occurred on March 28, 2008,
when “the Maldives, along with seventy-eight co-sponsors from all regional
groups, secured by consensus the adoption of the United Nations Human
Rights Council Resolution 7/23 on ‘Human Rights and Climate Change.’”104
This was heralded as the first instance of official U.N. recognition via
resolution that climate change has immediate “implications for the full
enjoyment of human rights.”105 Professor John Knox106 adds another
important element to the development of the link between human rights and
climate change. Knox notes that in January 2009, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) examined the
relationship and determined that climate change does threaten an array of
human rights, but that it does not necessarily violate human rights.
However, human rights law creates duties on states concerning climate
change and those duties include an obligation of international cooperation.107
What is the function of developing an applicable human rights
framework? In discussing the benefits of a rights-based approach to climate
change, Limon observes that “[h]umanizing climate change . . . creates an
ethical imperative to act that can with time translate into legal
obligations . . . .”108 Limon further asserts that a contribution that human
rights principles can make to climate change policy is the emphasis on
“accountability mechanisms, including . . . access to administrative and
judicial remedies, and . . . emphasis given to procedural rights such as access
to information and access to decision-making . . . .”109 Finally, Limon notes

103
Limon, supra note 3, at 441. Limon is an advisor at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Maldives to the United Nations Office at Geneva. He advises the Mission and the Maldives Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on issues including international human rights policy and environmental policy.
104
Id. at 443-44 (quoting Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 7th
Sess., March 3-28, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/78, at 65 (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/146/62/PDF/G0814662.pdf?OpenElement).
105
Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, supra note 104, quoted in Limon, supra note 3, at 444.
106
John Knox is a professor of law at Wake Forest University. He has advised the U.N. on human
rights and corporations, and has counseled the Center for International Environmental Law on human rights
implications of climate change impacts on the Maldives.
107
Knox, supra note 23, at 477.
108
Limon, supra note 3, at 451.
109
Id. at 452.
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that the rights-based framework approach may emphasize international
cooperation in addressing climate change.110
While the significance of such developments in the context of
broadening the human rights framework cannot be overstated, the narrow
application of such significant steps should not be ignored. Knox illustrates
a concept expressed in the OHCHR report, that human rights law places
duties on states that are relevant to climate change even in the absence of
explicit recognition that climate change violates human rights, with the
following analogy: “[a] mudslide not caused by a state may not be a
violation of human rights law, but that law may still require the state to take
steps to protect those in its path.”111 This statement highlights a
characteristic of traditional international human rights law: international
human rights law places upon states duties to their citizens.112 This
characteristic is a fundamental roadblock in the application of international
human rights to cross-border and global problems such as climate change.113
A recent breakthrough in the international human rights framework,
however, can be found in the OHCHR report’s assertion that a state’s duties
are not merely limited to national application: “states have an international
duty to cooperate in order to realize human rights.”114 Knox admits that this
breakthrough is extremely contentious, given that developed states resist the
idea of extraterritorial human rights duties.115 Its actual contribution to
climate negotiations remains unclear, and Resolution 10/4 adopted in
response to the OHCHR report does not reference the report’s cooperation
provision.116 While countries such as the Maldives pushed for inclusion of
the stronger cooperation language, many developing countries disagreed
with its inclusion, to the final detriment of the strength of Resolution 10/4.117
Thus, the clarification of a human right to a secure environment does
not by itself provide an accessible mechanism for compensation for all
climate change-induced adaptation strategies. The rights-based dialogue is
not yet developed enough to be practical for the particular adaptation context
faced by worst-case scenario island nations. Indeed, Limon admits that we
are no closer today to approaching a breakthrough in clarifying an explicit
110
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Knox, supra note 23, at 478.
112
John Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 A.J.I.L. 1, 1 (2008).
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Knox, supra note 23, at 478 (asserting that “many developed states have long resisted the
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right to a safe and healthy environment than we were in 1972.118 Likewise,
he admits that such a right would face some shortcomings in its contribution
to addressing climate change impacts, especially where responsibility for
harm lies beyond the victim state’s borders.119 Therefore, the discussion of
rights-based progression should not occur to the detriment and exclusion of
the progression of other more timely and appropriate legal mechanisms for
worst-case scenario countries such as Tuvalu. Rather, multiple approaches
to addressing climate change and providing redress for climate change
victims should be viewed as complementary. Pursuing redress under other
existing legal mechanisms, such as the principle of unjust enrichment,
should complement current efforts both to mitigate the impacts of climate
change and to advance a human right to a safe and secure environment.
IV.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT LITIGATION MAY BE THE BEST LEGAL THEORY
AVAILABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE VICTIMS

In light of the failure of tort liability-based litigation and the
insufficiency of rights-based approaches, unjust enrichment may be the best
legal theory available to climate change victims. The principle of unjust
enrichment is a general principle of international law, and can thus be
applied at both international and state levels. Unjust enrichment may be
used as an independent basis of liability when a defendant has been enriched
at the plaintiff’s expense, and thus the principle may be particularly useful to
SIDS.
A.

The Principle of Unjust Enrichment Is a General Principle of
International Law

The principle of unjust enrichment exists at both international and
domestic levels.120 In international law, the principle of unjust enrichment
enables a state to lodge a complaint against another state for recovery of
money or property on the ground that the other state has enriched itself at the
first state’s expense without legal justification.121 General principles of
international law “are among the sources of national and international law
which have long been recognized and applied in disputes between
states . . . [and]
are . . . expressions
of
national
legal
systems,
118

Id. at 472.
Id.
120
Charles Manga Fombad, The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in International Law, 30 C.I.L.S.A.
120, 121 (1997).
121
Id.
119
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and . . . expressions of unperfected sources of international law.”122 Unjust
enrichment can be characterized as a general principle of international law
under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. Arguably, unjust enrichment
was applied in Lena Goldfields,123 Chorzów Factory,124 and ADC v.
Hungary,125 and by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal between 1983
and 1987,126 to name a few examples. In domestic courts, the practice of
unjust enrichment can vary somewhat. Under English common law, for
example, the elements of an unjust enrichment claim require receipt of a
benefit, enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense, unjust retention of the benefit,
and consideration of whether the defendant had a defense.127 Similarly,
forms of unjust enrichment are recognized in civil law countries.128 Thus,
because the principle is recognized broadly, it may be considered a general
principle of international law.
B.

Unjust Enrichment May Be Particularly Useful to SIDS Because the
Principle May Be Used as an Independent Basis of Liability When a
Defendant Has Been Enriched at the Plaintiff’s Expense

The principle of unjust enrichment is particularly relevant to SIDS
because plaintiffs may be able to pursue a claim based in unjust enrichment
as an independent basis of liability when a defendant has been enriched at
the plaintiff’s expense. Moreover, as a gap-filling legal device, unjust
enrichment may have a particular role for SIDS where a relationship exists
between GHG emissions and their associated benefits to emitter countries on
the one hand, and the negative consequences of those emissions on the other.
The climate change-related problems facing SIDS cannot be easily redressed
by other traditional legal categories (such as tort, contract, or property law),
and thus unjust enrichment may fill that liability gap.

122

Cherif M. Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law”, 11
MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 768 (1990).
123
Ana T. Vohryzek-Griest, Unjust Enrichment Unjustly Ignored: Opportunities and Pitfalls in
Bringing Unjust Enrichment Claims Under ICSID, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L REV. 501, 503 (2010).
124
Id. at 522-27.
125
Id. at 529-36.
126
John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Experience, 83 A.J.I.L. 278, 292-93 (1989).
127
Brice Dickson, Unjust Enrichment Claims: A Comparative Overview, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 100,
105-06 (1995).
128
Id. at 112. Dickson specifically mentions the Civil Codes of Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, and the Netherlands as examples. The French use of unjust enrichment has expanded so that it is
now recognized in both administrative and private law; however, its scope is still narrower than that of
common law countries. Id. at 113.
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The Principle of Unjust Enrichment Can Be Used as an Independent
Basis of Liability

Plaintiffs may be able to pursue a claim based in unjust enrichment as
an independent basis of liability when a defendant has been enriched at the
plaintiffs’ expense. The principle of unjust enrichment reflects the moral
tenet that one person should not obtain unfair advantage at another’s
expense.129 Further, unjust enrichment originated as a gap-filling legal
theory when traditional legal categories (tort, contract, and property law)
were insufficient mechanisms to secure recovery for a legal wrong.130 Using
the English common law model from the United States, for example, the
Law of Restitution and supporting case law have developed three elements
necessary for a successful claim based in unjust enrichment: 1) an
enrichment must accrue to the defendant, 2) the enrichment must occur at
the expense of the plaintiff, and 3) the enrichment must be unjust.131 Such a
claim “must also survive any countervailing defenses or considerations.”132
With respect to the first element, the definition of “enrichment” may be
broadly construed. One approach is to “identify an enrichment as something
positive, [for example], an accretion of wealth.”133 The second element
focuses on the connection between the enrichment and the plaintiff’s loss.
This connection is most obvious when the defendant derives a gain by
causing loss to the plaintiff.134 However, the connection is sufficient even
when the defendant is not the cause-in-fact of the loss. For example, the
defendant need not be the actual wrongdoer, but merely retains the benefit
conferred by the plaintiff’s loss.135 Finally, with respect to the third element
a plaintiff must prove for a claim of unjust enrichment, the proffered
enrichment is considered unjust when “a defendant’s retention of the benefit
at [the] plaintiff’s expense would offend notions of fairness or equity.”136
In response to a plaintiff claiming damages based in unjust
enrichment, a defendant may attempt to invalidate the plaintiff’s allegations
of injustice where, on balance, the benefits accrued by the plaintiff outweigh
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Emily Sherwin, Symposium: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Restitution and Equity: An
Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2084, 2104 (2001).
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David N. Fagan, Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous
Peoples Against Multinational Corporations, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 626, 629 (2001).
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Fagan, supra note 130, at 646.
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the enrichment gained by the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense.137
However, this defense has its weaknesses, regardless of its legal validity. In
evaluating this defense in the case of indigenous peoples and multinational
corporations, one authority declared:
[M]erely producing a positive economic effect in a country may
not mitigate sufficiently the unjustness to the indigenous
peoples who bear the primary burden of the investment without
receiving any of the benefit . . . . [T]he retention of a benefit
obtained at the expense of a largely defenseless group would
seem to offend notions of “good conscience” and, therefore, be
precisely the activity against which the unjust enrichment
doctrine is designed to protect.138
Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment is uniquely insulated from the most
likely defense it would face in litigation: offsets for benefits received by the
plaintiffs.
2.

The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in the Climate Change Context Is
Particularly Compelling for SIDS

The principle of unjust enrichment may, therefore, have a role for
victims of climate change in SIDS: anthropogenic emissions of GHGs by
specific nations are irrefutable, and the subsequent problems facing SIDS
cannot be easily redressed by other traditional legal categories such as tort,
contract, or property law. The scenario is ripe for application of unjust
enrichment. For example, the first element of an unjust enrichment claim,
that an enrichment must accrue to the defendant, is satisfied in the Tuvaluan
context. Emitter countries have accrued wealth and economic development
by developing industries that contribute to GHG emissions with few
restrictions.
The second element, that the enrichment must occur at the expense of
the plaintiff, is also satisfied in the Tuvaluan context: the wealth and
economic development enjoyed by the people in countries such as the
United States and Australia accrued to the detriment of SIDS’ land (both
biophysically and geographically)—to the extent that the island nations must
seriously consider permanent relocation for their entire populations in order
to ensure survival. The important point here is that unjust enrichment does
not require that the plaintiff demonstrate his “expense” was due to the guilt
137
138
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Id. at 651.
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of a particular wrongdoer defendant—it only requires a showing that the
defendant has been enriched.139 This allows the relationship among the
parties to be somewhat attenuated: SIDS may establish a relationship as
plaintiffs to defendant emitter countries by relying on available scientific
analyses supporting GHG emissions and rising sea levels, and they may
establish a relationship between emitters (both past and present) and the
defendants—the people now living in these countries and enjoying their
enriched economic status—by linking the identities of the defendants
through long-lived entities, such as existing governments and the people
they represent.140 In other words, the defendants benefit, a third party emits,
and the plaintiff loses. Thus, unjust enrichment is intrinsically appropriate
for climate change litigation because of its inherent ability to avoid the
requirement that the defendant cause the plaintiff’s injury, and its ability to
instead focus on the benefits retained by the defendant.
Finally, the third element for a claim of unjust enrichment, that the
enrichment must be unfair, is also satisfied in the Tuvaluan context.141
While citizens of the United States and Australia enjoy a relatively high
quality of life as a result of each country’s emissions,142 Tuvaluans must
contemplate submerged lands and the loss of their status as a nation. That
Tuvalu may lose its ability to determine the location and future of its people
due to the conduct of big emitters is strikingly unfair. Thus, not only is the

139
Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate, 40
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COLUM. L. REV. 689, 698 (2003). Using unjust enrichment for climate change victims in the SIDS context
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the “original victim” here. One cannot help but wonder if fewer attenuated relationships may help build a
stronger unjust enrichment case.
141
Additionally, under the theory of unjust enrichment, the legality of the unjust conduct is no
defense. A defendant may be unjustly enriched “without having committed any other civil wrong.”
Margalynne Armstrong, Reparations Litigation: What About Unjust Enrichment?, 81 OR. L. REV. 771, 778
(2002).
142
For examples of measures of per-capita CO2 emissions in 2004 by country, see Eric. A. Posner &
Cass. R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1603-04 (2008). Notably, Australia is
ranked the ninth highest emitter, while Qatar and Kuwait are ranked first and second. Tuvalu and the
Maldives do not rank among the seventy-five highest per capita emitters of CO2 and are thus excluded from
discussion in the article. Note that per capita emissions rankings do not necessarily reflect national
emissions.

452

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 2

third element of a claim for unjust enrichment satisfied, but it is likely that a
defense challenging the “unjustness” of the enrichment would fail.143
3.

Potential Obstacles Facing Tuvalu in Applying Unjust Enrichment
May Be Overcome

For Tuvalu to prevail under a claim of unjust enrichment, several
obstacles would have to be overcome. Tuvalu would have to consider the
most appropriate venue in which to bring such a claim, it would have to
strategically determine how to characterize the parties to the claim, and it
would have to navigate sovereign immunity obstacles.144
Tuvalu would first have to determine in which venue to bring a claim
against an emitter for unjust enrichment, and how to characterize the parties.
The venue could include the ICJ, other international tribunals, or domestic
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REV. 1605, 1607 (2007) [hereinafter Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change]. Farber
explains that three categories of harm fit the profile of appropriate injuries for redress under a
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courts,145 while the parties could include the State of Tuvalu and any number
of emitter states. The answer to both questions, however, hinges on the
concept of sovereign immunity. Generally, “the immunity of a state from
the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed principle of
customary international law.”146 The restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity holds that “a foreign nation’s immunity does not apply to claims
arising from the nation’s private or commercial acts, but protects the nation
only from claims arising from its public functions.”147 Other than the
exception presented under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the
only way the doctrine can be circumvented is by waiving or submitting to
jurisdiction.148
One glaring option for Tuvalu to avoid sovereign immunity issues is
to sue emitter countries at the ICJ that submit to the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction, such as Australia, under the theory of unjust enrichment. The
other, more complicated, option is to sue any country (including those that
do not submit to compulsory jurisdiction before the ICJ) in either the ICJ, or
in a (most likely Tuvaluan) domestic court. One possible outcome with the
latter option would be that the defendant country would submit to
jurisdiction if it felt confident Tuvalu would not prevail, in an effort to shut
down litigation once and for all. Such an outcome would likely fail to
produce damages for Tuvalu, but would still function to further the political
discussion for developing a monetary mechanism which would compensate
climate change victims. In the alternative, Tuvalu could try to creatively
engineer a strategy using the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and
demonstrate that all or some portion of the actions taken when the emitter
country was emitting would satisfy the commercial exception to sovereign
immunity. Much work on the particular logistics and strategies under a
theory of unjust enrichment is needed; however, the applicability of the
theory is highly relevant to the climate change context in Tuvalu.
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CONCLUSION

Legal remedies for climate change victims continue to elude
proponents of tort liability and human rights. While tort liability-based
litigation in the climate change context encounters substantial substantive
and procedural problems, the application of human rights frameworks are
stymied by a slowly evolving link between climate change and human
rights. For countries such as Tuvalu, pressure is mounting to find an
alternative legal mechanism that may help produce the resources necessary
to adapt to climate change at a minimal loss to their lands and livelihoods.
Unjust enrichment may be used as an independent basis of liability when a
defendant has been enriched at the plaintiffs’ expense, enabling the plaintiffs
to avoid specific proximate cause, cause-in-fact, and sanction requirements
associated with torts, and the legal obligation and enforcement problems
associated with the process of developing and clarifying human rights law.
Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment has the potential to be particularly
useful to Tuvalu and other SIDS in the climate change context.

